In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders.

We introduce a regularity notion that generalizes the notion of concavity.

We study the problem of learning a linear model to set the reserve price in an auction, given contextual information, in order to maximize expected revenue fromtheseller side.

We consider a causal inference problem frequently encountered in online advertising systems, where a publisher (e.g., Instagram, TikTok) interacts repeatedly with human users and advertisers by sporadically displaying to each user an advertisement selected through an auction. Each treatment corresponds to a parameter value of the advertising mechanism (e.g., auction reserve-price), and we want to estimate through experiments the corresponding long-term treatment effect (e.g., annual advertising revenue). In our setting, the treatment affects not only the instantaneous revenue from showing an ad, but also changes each user's interaction-trajectory, and each advertiser's bidding policy -- as the latter is constrained by a finite budget. In particular, each a treatment may even affect the size of the population, since users interact longer with a tolerable advertising mechanism. We drop the classical i.i.d. assumption and model the experiment measurements (e.g., advertising revenue) as a stopped random walk, and use a budget-splitting experimental design, the Anscombe Theorem, a Wald-like equation, and a Central Limit Theorem to construct confidence intervals for the long-term treatment effect.

Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations \new{for} an item depend on the context that describes the item. However, the seller is not aware of the relationship between the context and buyers' valuations, i.e., buyers' preferences. The seller's goal is to design a learning policy to set reserve prices via observing the past sales data, and her objective is to minimize her regret for revenue, where the regret is computed against a clairvoyant policy that knows buyers' heterogeneous preferences. Given the seller's goal, utility-maximizing buyers have the incentive to bid untruthfully in order to manipulate the seller's learning policy.