The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the traditional economic models, it is assumed that the bidders' valuations are drawn from an underlying distribution and that the auction designer has perfect knowledge of this distribution. Despite this strong and oftentimes unrealistic assumption, it is remarkable that the revenue-maximizing combinatorial auction remains unknown. In recent years, automated mechanism design has emerged as one of the most practical and promising approaches to designing high-revenue combinatorial auctions. The most scalable automated mechanism design algorithms take as input samples from the bidders' valuation distribution and then search for a high-revenue auction in a rich auction class. In this work, we provide the first sample complexity analysis for the standard hierarchy of deterministic combinatorial auction classes used in automated mechanism design. In particular, we provide tight sample complexity bounds on the number of samples needed to guarantee that the empirical revenue of the designed mechanism on the samples is close to its expected revenue on the underlying, unknown distribution over bidder valuations, for each of the auction classes in the hierarchy. In addition to helping set automated mechanism design on firm foundations, our results also push the boundaries of learning theory. In particular, the hypothesis functions used in our contexts are defined through multi-stage combinatorial optimization procedures, rather than simple decision boundaries, as are common in machine learning.

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders.

We introduce a regularity notion that generalizes the notion of concavity.

We study the problem of learning a linear model to set the reserve price in an auction, given contextual information, in order to maximize expected revenue fromtheseller side.

We consider a causal inference problem frequently encountered in online advertising systems, where a publisher (e.g., Instagram, TikTok) interacts repeatedly with human users and advertisers by sporadically displaying to each user an advertisement selected through an auction. Each treatment corresponds to a parameter value of the advertising mechanism (e.g., auction reserve-price), and we want to estimate through experiments the corresponding long-term treatment effect (e.g., annual advertising revenue). In our setting, the treatment affects not only the instantaneous revenue from showing an ad, but also changes each user's interaction-trajectory, and each advertiser's bidding policy -- as the latter is constrained by a finite budget. In particular, each a treatment may even affect the size of the population, since users interact longer with a tolerable advertising mechanism. We drop the classical i.i.d. assumption and model the experiment measurements (e.g., advertising revenue) as a stopped random walk, and use a budget-splitting experimental design, the Anscombe Theorem, a Wald-like equation, and a Central Limit Theorem to construct confidence intervals for the long-term treatment effect.